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Abstract
Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift (PEAD) is a stock market phenomenon when a stock’s cumulative abnormal
return has a tendency to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise in the near term following an earnings
announcement. Although it is one of the most studied stock market anomalies, the current literature is often
limited in explaining this phenomenon by a small number of factors using simpler regression methods. In this
paper, we use a machine learning based approach instead, and aim to capture the PEAD dynamics using data from
a large group of stocks and a wide range of both fundamental and technical factors. Our model is built around the
Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) and uses a long list of engineered input features based on quarterly finan-
cial announcement data from 1 106 companies in the Russell 1 000 index between 1997 and 2018. We perform
numerous experiments on PEAD predictions and analysis and have the following contributions to the literature.
First, we show how Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift can be analysed using machine learning methods and
demonstrate such methods’ prowess in producing credible forecasting on the drift direction. It is the first time
PEAD dynamics are studied using XGBoost. We show that the drift direction is in fact driven by different factors
for stocks from different industrial sectors and in different quarters and XGBoost is effective in understanding the
changing drivers. Second, we show that an XGBoost well optimised by a Genetic Algorithm can help allocate
out-of-sample stocks to form portfolios with higher positive returns to long and portfolios with lower negative
returns to short, a finding that could be adopted in the process of developing market neutral strategies. Third, we
show how theoretical event-driven stock strategies have to grapple with ever changing market prices in reality,
reducing their effectiveness. We present a tactic to remedy the difficulty of buying into a moving market when
dealing with PEAD signals.
I. Introduction
The stock market is characterised by nonlinearities, discontinu-
ities, and multi-polynomial components because it continuously
interacts with many factors such as individual companys’ news,
political events, macro economic conditions, and general supply
and demand, etc. [1]. The non-stationary nature of the stockmar-
ket is supported by a widely accepted, but still hotly contested
economic theory Efficient Market Hypothesis which states that
asset prices fully reflect all available information and the market
onlymoves by reacting to new information. Such a theory implies
that the stock market behaves like a martingale and knowledge
of all past prices is not informative regarding the expectation of
future prices.
Ball and Brown [2] were the first to note that after earnings
are announced, estimated cumulative abnormal returns continue
to drift up for firms that are perceived to have reported good
financial results for the preceding quarter and drift down for
firms whose results have turned out worse than the market had
expected. The discovery of Post Earnings Announcement Drift
(PEAD), which is a violation of a semi-strong Efficient Market
Hypothesis, seems to suggest that while stock markets are gen-
erally efficient, there may be information leakages around the
announcement dates, coupled with post-earnings drift, result-
ing in price movement anomalies. It also seems to suggest that
past stock price information or other past economic or financial
information can potentially be used to predict price movement
following a significant economic event such as an earnings an-
nouncement.
Researches on Post Earnings Announcement Drift prolifer-
ated in the late 1980s and 1990s. Fama and French [3] show
that average stock returns co-vary with three factors, namely, the
market risk factor, the book-to-market factor, and the size factor.
Bhushan suggests that the existence of sophisticated and unso-
phisticated investors, transaction costs, and economies of scale
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in managing money can explain the market’s delayed response
to earnings [4]. We notice nearly all previous researches pooled
companies with negative and positive earnings surprises when
measuring the effect of earnings surprises on abnormal returns
and regress the absolute value of earnings surprise as well as
other factors against the absolute value of abnormal return [5].
However, we have found that stock markets do not just react sym-
metrically to negative and positive earnings surprises and there
are a lot more factors in play that drive the near term risk adjusted
returns of a stock following an earnings release.
Rather than trying to analyse the link between PEAD and
economic and accounting factors as commonly seen in the lit-
erature, by using machine learning models, we manage to leap
straight to the more important goal of predicting the direction
of PEAD. In this process we have overcome a number of con-
straints commonly seen in previous researches: we are including
a much wider range of factors including both fundamental and
technical/momentum factors; we achieve a higher level of gen-
erality without having to pre-group companies by the value of
their earnings surprises or other attributes prior to the analysis
or prediction (subsample analysis) which is common in the lit-
erature [6]. Additionally we have chosen 1 106 stocks that are
or once existed as components of the Russell 1 000 index (which
tracks approximately the 1 000 largest public companies in the
US) during the chosen time period between 1997 and 2018.
Our selection includes companies that either went bankrupt or
dropped out of Russell 1 000, significantly reducing survivor-
ship bias in our training data. This test population is larger than
most earlier studies of similar nature. For example, Beyaz and
colleagues only chose 140 stocks from S&P500 when they at-
tempted to forecast stock prices both six months and a year out
based on fundamental analysis and technical analysis [7], and
Bradbury used a sample of only 172 firms to research the re-
lationships among voluntary semi-annual earnings disclosures,
earnings volatility, unexpected earnings, and firm size [8]. Our
results should generalise better with the universe of stocks on the
US markets.
Recognising the highly nonlinear nature of stock price move-
ments, we have chosen to run our experiments using XGBoost
which is a state-of-the-art supervised model. We divide the
training data into in-sample and out-of-sample periods of vary-
ing lengths and use the in-sample data set to optimise a model’s
hyperparameters before training it. Our earlier experiments show
that grid search as a traditional way of finding an optimal param-
eter set is inexhaustive and can be very slow. Instead we have
chosen to use the highly adaptable Genetic Algorithm (GA) to
optimise our models [9]. We recognise hyperparameter opti-
misation is a delicate step and searching with a limited set of
parameters will result in a non-optimal model which will not
able to fit the essential structure of the training data set. To avoid
this potential problem, we have chosen to use a broad value range
and a small granular step for each of the hyperparameters. A 5-
fold cross validation (CV) is employed within each GA iteration
during the optimisation.
Our machine learning-based approach is in direct contrast to
most earlier financial research work in the literature as typified
by [10], which sought to devise different portfolios a priori by dif-
ferent factor characteristics and tried to analyse and make sense
of the link between portfolio returns and the corresponding eco-
nomic factors that segregated the portfolios. Instead, our model
automatically learns the intrinsic link between the input feature
space and stock price returns with no a priori assumptions. We
find that stocks that belong to different industrial sectors can
have their PEAD movements driven by different primary fac-
tors and such factors can also change from quarter to quarter.
Despite such differences and changes in the driving factors, a
GA optimised XGBoost model is able to pick up the underlying
signals embedded in our engineered features and forecast the 30
day PEAD direction with reasonable accuracy. We also study
the possibility of grouping stocks into portfolios according to
their predicted levels of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR).
We have found that ranking the out-of-sample stocks by their
predicted returns help form portfolios which consistently offer
higher positive returns and lower negative returns, a result that
could potentially form the basis of further usage in market neu-
tral long-short trading strategies. In the end, we also look at
the challenges of applying predictive models in real life markets
due to ever changing market prices and asymmetrical level of
information access by certain market participants. We share a
tactic that can turn a model’s forecasts into actionable signals.
II. Related Work
Since the discovery of Post Earnings Announcement Drift as a
stock market anomaly by Ball and Brown [2] who documented
the return predictability for up to two months after the annual
earnings announcements, extensive research has been carried
out in the literature though with varying results. For exam-
ple, Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin [11] found that systematic post-
announcement drifts in security returns are only observed for a
subset of earnings expectations models when testing drifts in the
[+1, +60] trading day period. In recent years, the literature has
become less limited to the specific study of PEAD and instead
put more focus on the direct predictions of stock price move-
ment using stocks’ fundamental and/or technical information,
again with varying rates of success. Malkiel studied the im-
pact of price/earnings (P/E) ratios and dividend yields on stock
prices using the Campbell-Shiller model. He conceded his work
demonstrating that exploitable arbitrage did not exist for investors
to earn excess risk-adjusted returns and he could not find amarket
timing strategy capable of producing returns exceeding a buy-
and-hold on a broad market index [12]. Olson and Mossman on
the other hand not only showed that an artificial neural network
(ANN) outperforms traditional regression based methods when
forecasting 12-month returns by examining 61 financial ratios
for 2352 Canadian stocks, but, more importantly, shows that by
using fundamental metrics sourced from earning reports, they
were able to achieve excessive risk-adjusted returns [13].
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Other authors went beyond metrics from earnings reports
and attempted stock forecast using both fundamental and tech-
nical analysis. Sheta et al. explored the use of ANNs, Support
Vector Machines (SVMs), and Multiple Linear Regression for
prediction of S&P500 market index. They selected 27 technical
indicators as well as macro economic indicators and reported
that SVM contributed to better predictions than the other models
tested [14]. Hafezi et al. considered both fundamental and tech-
nical analyses in a novel model called Bat-neural NetworkMulti-
agent System when forecasting stock returns. The resulted mean
absolute percentage error showed that the new model performed
better than a typical Neural Network coupled with a GA [15].
Alternative data are becoming popular, too. Solberg and Karlsen
investigated the possibility to predict the direction of stock prices
using scripts of earnings conference calls. By analysing 29 330
different earnings call scripts between 2014 and 2017 using four
different machine learning algorithms they managed to achieve
a classification error rate of 43.8% using logistic regression and
beat the S&P500 benchmark using both logistic regression and
gradient boosting. Their results showed that earnings calls con-
tain predictive power for the next day’s stock price direction post
earnings release [16].
Researchers also studied how machine learning would di-
rectly benefit financial trading. Through a series of applications
involving hundreds of predictors and stocks, Huck looked at
how to apply some of the state-of-the-art machine learning tech-
niques to manage a long-short portfolio. In that process he also
explored a series of practical questions with regard to the predic-
tor data and was able to show that the techniques he examined
generated useful trading signals for portfolios with short holding
periods [17]. Sant’Anna and Caldeira applied Lasso regression
for index tracking and long-short investing strategies. They used
stocks from three benchmarks, S&P100, Russell 1000, and the
Ibovespa Index from Brazil from 2010 to 2017 to assess the qual-
ity of Lasso-based tracking portfolios. By using co-integration
as a benchmark method to solve the same problems, they demon-
strated that the Lasso regression based approach was able to form
portfolios that produced similar returns compared to using co-
integration, but incurred significantly less transaction costs [18].
As a model that has only recently burst on the scene, there
is limited study of XGBoost in financial applications. Chatzis et
al. [19] evaluate the possibility of a market crash over a 1-day
and 20-day horizon across the global markets by forecasting 1-
day and 20-day stock market returns and see if they will have
dropped below a low quantile of historical distribution of stock
market returns. By using a vast set of data from global stockmar-
kets, bond markets and FX markets, the paper explores a large
set of supervised learning models including Logistic Regres-
sion, Decision Trees, Random Forest, Support Vector Machines,
Deep Neural Networks, and XGBoost. The paper draws conclu-
sions by declaring the superiority of certain models including
XGBoost over others by examining the forecast results on stock
returns through a list of statistical measurement metrics. Li and
Zhang [20] use XGBoost to dynamically predict the value of
a set of seven factors that contribute a stock selection process.
Dynamically generated factors are then used to select a portfolio
of different stocks whose return is measured over a multiple year
period. Portfolios of dynamically selected stocks are shown to
perform better than benchmark portfolios.
III. Model Features Generation
We have chosen to use 1106 US companies in the Russell-1000
index in total. The data time frame is between the first financial
quarter of 1997 (1997 Q1) and the fourth financial quarter of
2018 (2018 Q4). The model output is the 30 day Cumulative
Abnormal Return post earnings release of each individual stock
and the input space consists of the following set of unadjusted
data which we have sourced from Bloomberg:
• Financial statements data
• Earnings Surprise data
• Momentum indicator data
• Short interest data
In total, we have sourced 97 901 quarterly financial state-
ments from our chosen companies over the test time frame. The
final population of valid data points used for training and testing
whose input features include both financial statement metrics
and other economic metrics stands close to 50,000, depending
on the test cases. There are a number of reasons for the reduced
population: (a) there are no Earnings data, Short interest data
or other input feature data on Bloomberg for a good number of
historical financial quarters within the test time frame; (b) we
have discarded companies in certain historical quarters when the
earnings reports suffered badly from missing data; (c) We have
been very careful with whether an earnings report was released
beforemarket opened, aftermarket closed or during trading hours
as such a difference is significant as we would need to alter the
forecast starting point accordingly. Bloomberg is missing the
release time of day for some financial quarters in earlier years,
and we have discarded those quarters.
A. Financial Statements data
As shown in Table 1, twenty nine metrics from earnings reports
have been chosen to create training data.
Based on the reported value of these metrics, we have en-
gineered new features as quarterly change and yearly change of
each of these financial metrics.
B. Earnings Surprise data
Earnings Surprise represents how much a company’s actual re-
portedEarnings Per Share (EPS) ismore (or less) than the average
of a selected group of stock analysts’ estimates on the same quar-
ter’s EPS.We are not calculating Earnings Surprise as a%change
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Cash Operating Margin
Cash from Operating Activities Price to Book Ratios
Cost of Revenue Price to Cashflow Ratios
Current Ratio Price to Sales Ratios
Dividend Payout Ratio Quick Ratio
Dividend Yield Return On Assets
Free Cash Flow Return On Common Equity
Gross Profit Revenue
Income from Continued Operations Short Term Debt
Inventory Turnover Total Asset
Net Debt to EBIT Total Asset
Net Income Total Debt to Total Assets
Operating Expenses Total Debt to Total Equity
Operating Income Total Inventory
Total Liabilities
Table 1: Earnings report metrics chosen as input features
between the reported EPS and market estimated EPS because (a)
%change is very volatile when a EPS level is close to zero and a
small change can lead to a misleadingly large %change, and (b)
we would like to avoid the change-of-signs problem.
We have subsequently engineered the following three features
related to Earnings Surprise:
• Current quarter’s Earnings Surprise (reported EPS minus
market estimated EPS);
• Difference between current quarter’s Earnings Surprise
and that of the previous quarter;
• Difference between current quarter’s Earnings Surprise
and the average Earnings surprise of the preceding three
quarters;
C. Momentum Indicators
We have chosen the following technical/momentum indicator
values calculated on the same day an individual company’s quar-
terly earnings data was released:
• 9-day Relative Strength Index (RSI)
• 30-day Relative Strength Index
• 5-day Moving Average / 50-day Moving Average
• 5-day Moving Average /200-day Moving Average
• 50-day Moving Average / 200-day Moving Average
We believe all these indicators should in a way measure how a
stock’s recent short term movements compare to its historical
movements further back in time. The inclusion of momentum
indicators is motivated by the intention to allow the prediction
process of future stock movements to take into account a stock’s
recent movement trend as information leakage does happen prior
to financial reportings. We have engineered the three ratios of
short termmoving averages to near or long termmoving averages
as proxies to the golden cross indicators.
D. Short Interest data
Short interest ratio is released for most companies twice a month
and is calculated by dividing the number of shares short in a
stock by the stock’s average daily trading volume. The short
interest ratio is a good gauge on how heavily shorted a stock may
be versus its trading volume. The most recent short interest ratio
for each company prior to its earnings release is sourced as an
input feature to the model for that company.
IV. Data Pre-processing
With totally 1106 companies involved over 21 years, there is a
lot of data representing input features for each company at each
quarter. In order for them to be understood by the model, we put
them into a matrix-like data structure A ∈ Mm×n(R), where each
of the m rows represents a n dimensional training data point, in-
dexed by the pairing of a company name and a historical quarter,
and each column holds data of the same feature from all the data
points.
Beforewe put the data of all the companies and of all the quar-
ters into a matrix, we pre-process each company’s data to deal
with outliers and to standardise data of every company. Firstly,
we employ Winsorisation [21] to reduce the number of outliers
present in the input features. This is carried out on the feature
data of each individual company. Secondly, we standardise a
selective group of features of each company. Every company’s
standardised features will then be stacked back into a full training
data set. The pre-processing process is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Steps of Data Pre-processing
V. Models and Methods
A. Extreme Gradient Boosting
Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) is a scalable machine
learning system for tree boosting invented by Tianqi Chen [22],
which has gained much prominence in recent years. It distin-
guishes itself from other existing tree boosting methods [23] [24]
by having cache-aware and sparsity-aware learnings. The former
technology gives the system twice the speed against running a
non-cache-aware but otherwise identical greedy tree splitting
algorithm, and the latter gives an amazing 50 times speed boost-
ing against a naive implementation handling an Allstate-10k
dataset [22]. More importantly, XGBoost has achieved algorith-
mic optimisations by introducing a regularised learning objective
within a tree structure which helps achieve smart tree splitting
and branch pruning.
For a data set in matrix form A ∈ Mm×n(R) with m data
points and n features, a tree ensemble model uses K base leaner
functions to predict the output:
y˜i = φ(xi) =
K∑
k=1
fk(xi), fk ∈ F, (1)
where F is the space of regression trees. Each hypothesis fk
corresponds to an independent tree structure q with leaf scores
ω. XGBoost utilises regression trees each of which contains a
score on each of its leaves. These scores help form the decision
rules in the trees to classify each set of inputs into leaves and
calculate the final predicted output by summing up the scores
in the related leaves. Unlike other standard gradient boosting
models such as AdaBoost and GBM which do not intrinsically
perform regularisation, XGBoost minimises a regularised loss
function in order to learn the set of functions:
L(φ) =
∑
i
`(ŷi, yi) +
∑
k
Ω( fk). (2)
Here, ` is a differentiable convex loss function for the model
output and the regularisation term is defined as (though not lim-
ited to) Ω( f ) = γT + 12λ | |ω | |2, which reduces the chance of
overfitting. As in a typical gradient tree boosting model, a new
base learner regression tree fi which most minimises the loss
function in equation 2 is greedily and iteratively added to the fi-
nal loss function. Let ŷi,t be the model output of the i-th instance
at the t-th iteration the loss function can be re-written as
Lt (φ) =
∑
i,k
`(yi, ŷi,t−1 + ft (xi)) +
∑
k
Ω( fk,t ). (3)
By taking the Taylor expansion on this loss function up to the
second order and removing the constant terms as a result of the
expansion the loss function can be simplified to:
Lt (φ) =
T∑
j=1
[G jωj + 1
2
(Hj + λ)ω2j ] + λT, (4)
where
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G j =
∑
i∈Ij
gi
Hj =
∑
i∈Ij
hi
Ij = {i |q(xi) = j}
gi = ∂ŷi, t−1`(yi, ŷi,t−1)
hi = ∂2ŷi, t−1`(yi, ŷi,t−1).
Here, T is the number of leaves in the tree. With ωj being
independent with respect to others, Tianqi [22] has proven that
the best ωj for a given tree structure q(x) should be
ω∗j = −
G j
Hj + λ
, (5)
which in turn makes the objective function come to its final
form:
L∗j = −
1
2
T∑
j=1
G2j
Hj + λ
+ γT . (6)
Ideally, the model would enumerate all possible tree struc-
tures with a quality score and pick the best one to be added
iteratively. In reality, this is intractable and optimisation has to
be executed one tree level at a time. This is made available by the
final form of the loss function, as the model uses it as a scoring
function to decide on the optimal leaf splitting point. Assume
that IL and IR are the instance sets of left and right nodes after the
split. Letting I = IL ∪ IR, the scoring function for leaf splitting
is
Lsplit =
1
2
[ (∑i∈IL gi)2∑
i∈IL hi + λ
+
(∑i∈IR gi)2∑
i∈IR hi + λ
+
(∑i∈I gi)2∑
i∈I hi + λ
]
− γ.
(7)
These scores are then used by a method called the exact
greedy algorithm to enumerate all the possible splits for con-
tinuous features, allowing each level of a tree to be optimised and
the overall loss function to be minimised in the process. When
deployed on a distributed platform XGBoost employs approxi-
mate algorithms instead to alleviate the huge memory consump-
tion demanded by the exact greedy algorithm although this is not
needed in our experiments which run on a single machine.
B. Hyperparameter Optimisation
Model optimisation is one of the two most important steps (the
other being data cleansing) in ensuring the model output can
meaningfully capture the underlying dynamics of the dependent
variable. In search of optimal hyperparameter sets, we initially
experimented a more straightforward approach of grid search
but found it less effective in its performance and inexhuastive
in the search results. GA as an adaptable and easily extensible
heuristic optimisation method is chosen instead to carry out this
task. Table 2 gives the list of model hyperparameters we have
put through GA. Before we start the optimisation process, we
first split the population of data into training data and test data.
Selection of the out-of-sample test data varies and depends on
the nature of a test which will be explained in subsequent sec-
tions. It is the training data that we use to optimise the model.
We use 5-fold cross validation to calculate the fitness value on
a particular set of hyperparameters examined by the GA. To do
that we split the training data into five equal groups, use four
groups to train the model and calculate the fitness value using
the last group (validation). This process is repeated five times
iteratively on each of the five groups and the final fitness value
is the averaged fitness of the five iterations.
To optimise the model, each hyperparameter is randomly ini-
tialised according to its own valid range of values. This initiali-
sation is repeated 40 times so that we have 40 sets of randomly
initialised hyperparameters to start the GA process with. Each
set is called a population, and each hyperparameter within a set is
called a chromosome. All of the 40 populations are considered to
be part of the current generation. The GA process carries out a 5-
fold cross-validation on a model using each of the 40 populations
of parameters and when finished, keeps the 20 populations that
have produced the smallest fitness values in the cross validation
step. These 20 sets or populations of hyperparameters are consid-
ered to have performed better in forecasting post-announcement
drifts with the current model than the 20 discarded ones. The 20
better populations are then used to cross-breed into 20 new pop-
ulations and in this process mutation is allowed to happen to the
cross-bred populations, i. e., chromosomes in the 20 newly cre-
ated populations are allowed to randomly change value following
a predefined level of probability. At the end of this process, we
have produced a new and potentially better set of 40 populations
of hyperparameters and we call them the new generation. The
new generation are then fed through a second iteration of the
GA process until eventually the minimum fitness value produced
by the cross-validation step no longer changes its value within
tolerance and at this point we have arrived at the optimal set of
hyperparameters which produces the smallest fitness value when
being used in the current model. Figure 2 shows how GA and
Cross Validation work together to produce the set of hyperpa-
rameters of each model which result in the highest prediction
accuracy (smallest fitness value) on the validation set.
VI. Results
All of our experiments centre around the 30 day post-earnings
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) as a measure of risk ad-
justed stock price return. An abnormal return is between the
actual return of a security and its expected rate of return.
ARi = ri − E(ri), (8)
where ARi is the one-day abnormal return for company i
on day t, ri is the actual one-day stock return and E(ri) is the
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Hyper Parameters
Gamma
Max depth
Sub sample
Learning Rate
Minimum child weight
Column sample by tree
Table 2: XGBoost hyperparameters optimised by GA + CV
Figure 2: Hyperparameter Optimisation using GA + CV
expected one-day return of stock i. As explored by Kim [10],
there is a variety of ways of evaluating the expected return in-
cluding using quantitative models such as the one-factor CAPM
model and the Fama French three-factor model [3]. In our exper-
iments, we choose to use the S&P500 index return to represent
the broader market’s return and use that to proxy a stock’s ex-
pected return. Consequently, our model output for stock i, which
is the cumulative abnormal return from T1 to T2, is defined as:
CARi(T1,T2) =
T2∑
t=T1
(ARit ) =
T2∑
t=T1
(rit − rS&P500). (9)
A. Single Stock Forecast
In this experiment, we have chosen stocks that filed for earnings
with SEC in the four quarters in each financial year from 2014
to 2018 as our out-of-sample test population. That means, we
first run a forecast on movement direction of all the stocks that
reported earnings in 2014 while using all the data prior to 2014
as training data. Once done, we move on to repeat the same
exercise on stocks that reported in 2015, etc. It should be noted
that a company that filed in each of the 4 quarters of a financial
year is considered as four independent data points since the only
data consumed by the XGBoost + GAmodel to predict the PEAD
direction of a stock at any quarter are the near term momentum
signals and financial statement data of this stock in that particular
quarter.
Separately, the same test as described above is also repeated
on stocks belonging to a particular industrial sector. Bloomberg
categorises US companies into seven sectors: Industrial, Basic
Materials, Consumer Cyclical, Consumer Non-Cyclical, Finan-
cial, Technology, Communications, Energy, and Utilities. Our
chosen companies and their data are divided up into seven groups
by industrial sector so that we can run the same tests per industrial
group.
Each of such tests whether on all of the stocks or stocks
belonging to a particular industrial sector are run 100 times.
In each run, the same set of training data are used to train the
model whose performance is verified using the same set of out-
of-sample test data. This generates 100 sets of results for each
test from which stats are calculated.
Results and stats of predicting 30 day PEAD direction in
each year from 2014 to 2018 and over the seven industrial sec-
tors are presented in figure 3. Our results clearly suggest that
our model has strong prediction power and is able to pick up the
patterns in the input data space when there is any driver in it. It
is particularly interesting to see the model performs much better
with stocks from some industrial sectors than others. Given that
the same set of input features is used across the board, there is
clear evidence that our data is more impactful to some sectors
than others. There are probably two reasons that can explain
this observation. First, there are other data that are not included
in our feature space that does affect stock movements follow-
ing earnings release. Second, stocks from different sectors are
subject to different drivers, i. e., investment personnel/computer
trading algorithms look for signals in different financial metrics
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Figure 3: Accuracy rate of predicting 30 day PEAD movement
for different sectors. Even if the same driving features are exam-
ined, the implicit feature weighting must be different for different
sectors.
The first reason is true, as there are impactful data that have
yet to be included in our research, such as management’s guid-
ance, recent revisions of analysts’ price forecast, other text in-
formation carried in financial reports, and meeting minutes with
analysts, etc. It is entirely possible that certain stocks, or stocks
from certain sectors are more susceptible to those data and the
absence of such data reduces the model’s prediction accuracy on
those stocks.
We have taken a closer look at the second possible cause and
we find indeed stocks from different sectors are driven by differ-
ent factors. With the 100 groups of tests we have carried out on
individual sectors in each financial year from 2014 to 2018, we
have counted the appearance of the three factors that appear most
often as the top five driving forces. The results are recorded in
the Appendix section of this paper and present some very inter-
esting findings. First, most of the time, it is the three EPS related
metrics that feature heavily on the top five spots of most influen-
tial factors. This finding is consistent with market practice and
Earning Per Share surprise/disappointment is indeed one of the
most important factors that investors examine. We need to point
out that two of these features are engineered by us, which repre-
sent how the current quarter’s reported EPS compares to those
at the preceding quarters. The fact that these two factors also
dominate shows that investors look for more complexmovements
in financial metrics. Second, over the years, we consistently see
important albeit less strong features appearing on the top five list
for some of the sectors. For instance, the quarterly change in Re-
turn On Assets, Price-to-Sales Ratio, and Dividend Payout Ratio
are consistently making up the top five spots driving PEAD of
stocks from the Industrial, Financial, and Basic Materials sec-
tors respectively. We have carried out separate forecasting tests
using the three EPS features only, and did not obtain good re-
sults which show that the model cannot be driven purely by a
handful of key features and other, less strong, but also impactful
features must not be ignored. Third, in the years when our model
produces better prediction results for a particular sector, we are
frequently seeing features that are more consistently dominant.
This is represented by higher occurrence counts observed for
the dominant features. This can be observed in the results for
the Industrial, Consumer Cyclical, and Consumer Non-Cyclical
sectors. The opposite is also true. With Energy and Utilities
being the most difficult sectors to predict, the model is returning
an inconsistent set of top drivers from the 5 yearly tests among
which the occurrence count is also comparatively lower. With-
out strong and consistent drivers among our feature data for such
sectors, the prediction result is unsurprisingly poorer.
The results of our experiments in this section help us conclude
that Post Earnings-Announcement Drift is not merely a market
anomaly, but a characteristics of the markets whose direction
can be materially predicted. The strength of signal may vary in
time and from sector to sector, but machine learning models —
especially an XGBoost well optimised by GA— are able to pick
up on them. However, the fact that the model performs well with
stocks from certain sectors but not on others suggest that there
may be limitations in our input feature space or the way the spe-
cial features have been engineered. The input spacemay not have
captured enough driving factors for certain sectors. We acknowl-
edge that, when a company makes an earnings announcement,
information come out in many different forms such as in financial
metric numbers, textual information embedded in the documents
filed with SEC, earnings calls with a selected group of equity
analysts, let alone information leakage prior to announcement or
even insider trading. Trying to capture and take advantage of
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more forms of drivers on Post Earnings Announcement Drifts is
a future research topic.
B. PEAD Analysis on Portfolio of Stocks
We believe it is meaningful to evaluate the dynamics of post-
earnings drifts in the context of portfolios. In the subsequent
series of tests, we use the model to forecast the actual level of 30
day post earning cumulative abnormal returns instead of only the
movement direction. We rank out-of-sample stocks according
to each stock’s predicted returns from high to low, group stocks
together into small portfolios and examine the actual returns of
the portfolios.
B.1. Stocks that reported earnings in the same financial quarter
We’vemainly examined stocks that reported earnings in the same
financial quarter in the years between 2014 and 2018. In each
test we use all the data prior to the test quarter for training and
carry out stock return prediction on stocks in the test quarter. In
all the tests once the stocks being examined have been ranked
according to their model-predicted post earnings returns, we are
consistently observing that portfolios which include stocks from
top quantiles of the ranked list are producing higher positive
returns, whereas portfolios which include stocks from bottom
quantiles are producing lower negative returns. Theoretically, a
long-short market neutral strategy [25] could be formed through
longing the top quantile portfolios and shorting the bottom ones.
We’ve selected the Q3 2018 and Q4 2018 earning seasons
to demonstrate the results . One of the reasons for choosing
these two quarters is that the US stock market went through two
polar opposite phases of development in these two quarters with
the S&P500 shedding 20% in the last quarter of 2018 (around
the time most Q3 2018 earnings were reported in the US) amid
fear of Fed rate rises and US-China trade war escalation among
other things but gaining a major rebound in the first quarter of
2019 (when most US companies reported Q4 2018 earnings).
Our intention is to evaluate if our model can successfully capture
those very different PEAD dynamics given very different macro
conditions and different company specific accounts.
Each point on figures 4 and 5 corresponds to the actual re-
turn of a portfolio consisting of 100 stocks when we move down
the list of out-of-sample stocks which have now been ranked by
their predicted 30-day risk-adjusted returns following earnings
releases. For instance, the first point is the actual return of a
portfolio consisting of the 1st to the 100th stocks and the second
point is the actual return of a portfolio including the 2nd to the
101st stocks, etc. We consistently produce similar figures with a
downward slope when we continuously run the same tests. Our
model has captured an unseen collective trend of movement by
groups of stocks as triggered by their earnings release and other
relevant economic factors.
B.2. Stocks that reported earnings on the same date
If we were to construct market neutral portfolios, practically
speaking it would only make sense if we could execute the buy-
ing and short-selling of model-chosen stocks within a short time
frame, such as within a day or ideally less. Here, we run the
same portfolio test on stocks which filed for earnings with SEC
on the same date. Two dates in 2018 with busy earnings release
activities were chosen for demonstration. Figures 6 and 7 are re-
turns of portfolios created using stocks that reported earnings on
each date. The stocks have been ranked by their model-predicted
30-day post earning CAR before being grouped into portfolios.
Once again, the combination of the XGBoost-GA model and our
engineered input features is producing the kind of results which
can be used to rank stocks and construct portfolios, which would
produce higher positive returns or lower negative returns.
Table 3 gives the stats on how the top quantile portfolios and
bottom quantile portfolios are performing compared against the
average return of all the out-of-sample stocks. In some cases,
returns from portfolios consisting of top/bottom quantile stocks
are considerably higher/lower than the out-of-sample stock pop-
ulation’s average. Such patterns of portfolio returns could have
theoreticallymade themgood candidates for a long-short strategy
capitalising on the events of earnings release. This, however, is
made difficult in reality, as we will discuss more about the time-
liness of the signals.
C. Trading on Earning Event Signals
In the aforementioned experiments we have chosen the last pub-
licly available tradable stock price before an earnings release
as the starting point of a 30 day forecasting period. This is an
intuitive choice and commonly seen in the literature. For in-
stance, Erlien [26] uses the end point of her training window as
the beginning of a calculation window for cumulative abnormal
returns. Similarly, when examining how numerous factors drives
the revision of analysts’ consensus forecast on a company’s EPS,
Ahmed and Irfan [27] collect the final consensus available prior
to earnings announcement to start the forecast period.
However in reality a company’s stock price moves on receipt
of the first trickle of news. Information is never symmetrical,
and some parties always possess greater material knowledge
than others. They can and will act on such material informa-
tion driving the stock price away from the last tradable price
before the wider market gains access to the same level of infor-
mation. Also, the incorporation of earnings information into the
latest price is hugely accelerated by the presence of algorithmic
trading systems as verified by Frino et al. who studied a unique
dataset obtained from the Australian Securities Exchange [28].
Correct forecasting of stock movements upon financial events is
not practically useful unless they can be acted upon.
With this in mind, we have attempted to forecast cumulative
abnormal returns from 1 day after the announcement of news
to 30 day after, i. e., CAR from t1 to t30. Our results show
that the forecasting is inferior with accuracy of around 50% and
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Figure 4: 2018 Q4 test result. Actual returns of moving portfolios consisting of 100 stocks. All stocks have been pre-ranked by the
model-predicted stock returns from high to low.
Figure 5: 2018 Q3 test result. Actual returns of moving portfolios consisting of 100 stocks. All stocks have been pre-ranked by the
model-predicted stock returns from high to low.
sometimes less and cannot be relied upon. This is not at all
surprising, because, as per the efficient market hypothesis any
granular earnings information embedded in the financial state-
ments and management’s guidance, coupled with the market’s
own interpretations, will have been mostly consumed by the
markets and reflected in the latest stock prices not too long after
the announcement. A similar observation was already seen by
Allen and Karjalainen [29] that introducing a one-day delay to
trading signals removes most of the forecasting ability when they
used GAs to find technical trading rules.
Since we are not able to accurately forecast the direction of
CAR from tt+∆t to tt+T (with ∆t being non-negligible) using
newly released financial statements data and a stock’s momen-
tum signals prior to announcement, we have devised a tactic to
infer the delayed-starting direction. In this case we wait until 1
day after earnings release. It is important to point out that since
we intend to trade on a stock’s movement from t1 to t30, our
standpoint is now 1 day after the earnings announcement, and
we are already in possession of the knowledge of how a stock
has moved from t0 to t1. Standing near the close of the market 1
day after announcement, we would follow the following steps to
infer a stock’s movement from t1 to t30:
1. Stock Exclusion: Exclude all the stocks whose actual
movement from t0 to t1 are within the interval of [-0.05%,
0.05%] (obtained through empirical analysis) so as to
eliminate stocks with weak immediate response to earn-
ings announcements;
2. Re-run the forecast on PEAD direction from t0 to t30 by
also including in the input space a stock’s known move-
ment direction from t0 to t1. The overall accuracy has
increased to around 70% due to this new input to the
model;
3. Filtering: Select stocks whose real movement from t0 to
t1 is in opposite direction compared with the predicted
movement from t0 to t30, i. e., select stocks which have
gone up (down) in the first day despite being forecasted to
move down (up) over 30 days;
4. For all the remaining stocks, deduce a stock’s movement
direction from t1 to t30 to be the same as the predicted
movement direction from t0 to t30.
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Figure 6: 02 Aug 2018. Actual returns of moving portfolios consisting of 50 stocks from all sectors that reported earnings on this
date. All stocks have been pre-ranked by the model-predicted stock returns from high to low.
Figure 7: 25 Oct 2018. Actual returns of moving portfolios consisting of 50 stocks from all sectors that reported earnings on this
date. All stocks have been pre-ranked by the model-predicted stock returns from high to low.
We test this tactic using data from 2016, 2017, and 2018,
respectively. Data from preceding years are used for training.
As noted in an earlier section, a company that filed in each of
the four quarters of a year is considered as four independent data
points. Table 4 gives the results of applying this tactic on the
three years. After stock exclusion and filtering the number of
eligible stocks have come down to lower hundreds. With the
remaining stocks we observe that we are consistently achieving
close to 60% accuracy in inferring the stock direction from t1 to
t30. The important thing is that, since this tactic is meant to be
exercised by a trader at or near the close of market one day after
an earnings announcement, this is a signal that can genuinely be
acted upon. We also expect the overall accuracy of inferring the
stock direction from tt+∆t to tt+T to increase once we are able to
further increase the PEAD prediction accuracy by the model in
general. We believe this is possible, as there are other sources of
impactful information that have yet to be included in the feature
space, such as management’s guidance, equity analyst’s price
revisions, other text data carried in financial reports, and meet-
ing minutes with analysts, etc. This is another potential future
research direction.
VII. Conclusion
Post-earnings announcement drift is a well known and well stud-
ied stock market anomaly when a stock’s risk adjusted price can
continue in the direction of an earnings surprise in the near tomid
term following an earnings release. Past research was, however,
often limited in using simpler regression based methods to ex-
plain this phenomenon, and was often confined to using a limited
set of explaining factors. Even fewer research was carried out
on how to potentially take advantage of this known anomaly and
conduct actionable forecast on stock price movements following
such a significant economic event to companies. Attempting to
fill this gap in the literature, our experiment is including a much
bigger set of carefully selected input factors of various types
with some being specifically engineered, sourcing the data over
a longer historical time frame and attempting to forecast the di-
rection of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) with a machine
learning approach. We have adopted the state-of-the-art XG-
Boost and put it through a rigorous optimisation process. We not
only looked at specific forecast success rates, but also examined
if there is a collective trend of movement enjoyed by a group
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Out-of-sample
Time Frame Industries
Forecast
Holding Period
Top Quantile
Portfolio Return
Average Actual
Return
Bottom Quantile
Portfolio Return
Q4 2018 All 30 days 3.90% -0.29% -3.76%
Q3 2018 All 30 days 4.09% 0.36% -4.78%
02-Aug-18 All 30 days 2.75% 1.16% 0.54%
25-Oct-18 All 30 days 3.83% 1.06% -1.64%
Table 3: Actual returns of portfolios consisting of top and bottom quantile stocks. Stocks have been ranked by their predicted
returns
Year tested
No. of
out-of-samples
before filtering
No. of
out-of-samples after
filtering
t0 to t30 accuracy
by model
Inferred accuracy t1 to t30
for remaining stocks
2016 3635 254 71.40% 58.30%
2017 3715 151 70.80% 60.30%
2018 3728 261 69.90% 57.50%
Table 4: Accuracy of inferring stock direction from t1 to t30 using model predicted direction from t0 to t30 and the known stock
movement from t0 to t1
of stocks following their individual earnings release. First, our
results show that when properly configured using a Generic Al-
gorithm, XGBoost produces meaningful prediction accuracy on
the direction of PEAD. We demonstrated that our selected in-
put features were genuinely driving PEAD with a classification
success rate going up to 63% depending on the test scenarios.
In a further breakdown, we observed that stocks from different
industrial sectors and at a different time can have their PEADs
driven by different primary factors. The strengths of the driving
factors are well understood by our model with stocks from cer-
tain sectors producing excellent/poor forecast results when the
underlying factor dominance is more/less pronounced. Second,
guided by the model’s forecast outputs we found that it is pos-
sible to build portfolios which consistently offer higher positive
returns and lower negative returns and such an observation could
potentially form the basis of market neutral long-short trading
strategy. Third, we studied the challenges of applying earning
event signals in real trading. Market participants with informa-
tion advantage can drive the price away before the rest of the
markets have an opportunity to act on the signals. Instead of
trying to buy in as soon as event data comes out, we have de-
vised a tactic to create opportunities to delay-buy into the market
at a later time using the same prediction results by the models
as well as public knowledge of market movements immediately
following the release of earnings data. Lastly, future efforts will
need to also investigate recent methods of deep learning, which,
in our preliminary experiments were inferior to the considered
approach. However, their partial or combined usage such as for
representation learning or data augmentation appears promising.
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VIII. Appendix
We are listing the most significant driving factors for stocks from each of the seven industrial sectors as indicated by our XGBoost
+ GA model. The results are created after running 100 tests on each group of stocks. The occurrence of features has been counted.
The three features that most frequently appear as the top five driving factors are given along with their occurrence counts. These
information is provided for all the years and industrial sectors that have been tested. In all the tables provided in Appendix, F1 to
F5 represent the top five most impactful features. Features whose name starts with the name of a financial variable and ends with
"Q_Change" or "Y_Change" represents the quarterly change or yearly change of the same variable. URL to the source code and
source data will be provided upon acceptance of the paper.
2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 45 EPS_EarningsSurprise 2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 2
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 31 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 12 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 4
F3 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 19 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 8
F4 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 19 Return_On_Common_Equity 13 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 8
F5 Operating_Income_Y_Change 13 Return_On_Common_Equity 12 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 8
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 45 EPS_EarningsSurprise 4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 1
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 43 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 3
F3 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 30 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 10 Operating_Income_Y_Change 4
F4 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 19 Return_On_Common_Equity 13 Operating_Income_Y_Change 10
F5 Operating_Income_Y_Change 14 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 13 Return_On_Common_Equity 12
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 36 EPS_EarningsSurprise 13 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 1
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 32 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 14 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 3
F3 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 24 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 14 EPS_EarningsSurprise 3
F4 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 23 Return_On_Common_Equity 8 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 7
F5 Operating_Income_Y_Change 17 Return_On_Common_Equity 10 Gross_Profit_Y_Change 6
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 27 EPS_EarningsSurprise 18 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 5
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 29 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 9 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 9
F3 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 28 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 10 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 7
F4 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 17 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 16 Return_On_Common_Equity 3
F5 Operating_Income_Y_Change 25 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 6 Return_On_Common_Equity 4
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 44 EPS_EarningsSurprise 4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 2
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 36 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 6 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 5
F3 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 26 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 14 EPS_EarningsSurprise 5
F4 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 31 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 6 Operating_Income_Y_Change 5
F5 Operating_Income_Y_Change 20 Return_On_Common_Equity 16 Cost_Of_Revenue_Q_Change 2
Table 5: Top five driving factors for all stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
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2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 94 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 6 EPS_EarningsSurprise 0
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 67 EPS_EarningsSurprise 20 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 6
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 64 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 19 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 7
F4 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 55 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 9 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 9
F5 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 20 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 12 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 11
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 52 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 39 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 52 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 34 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 66 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 9 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 8
F4 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 36 PC_Ratios_Y_Change 16 Current_Ratio_Q_Change 11
F5 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 24 RSI-30D 11 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 10
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 64 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 24 EPS_EarningsSurprise 10
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 51 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 22 EPS_EarningsSurprise 18
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 46 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 18 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 17
F4 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 27 EPS_EarningsSurprise 14 EPS_EarningsSurprise 14
F5 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 23 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 20 Current_Ratio_Q_Change 17
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 72 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 15 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 39 EPS_EarningsSurprise 36 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 16
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 46 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 31 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8
F4 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 27 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 14 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 11
F5 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 19 PC_Ratios_Y_Change 15 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 14
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 65 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 19 EPS_EarningsSurprise 14
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 54 EPS_EarningsSurprise 19 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 15
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 53 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 21 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 10
F4 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 18 Current_Ratio_Q_Change 15 PC_Ratios_Y_Change 14
F5 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 24 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 14 RSI-30D 9
Table 6: Top five driving factors for the Industrial stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 36 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 11 PC_Ratios 6
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 17 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 12 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 9
F3 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 10 DMA_50D/200D 9 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 7
F4 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9 PC_Ratios 7
F5 EPS_EarningsSurprise 8 PC_Ratios 6 PC_Ratios 6
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 31 DMA_50D/200D 9 EPS_EarningsSurprise 3
F2 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 14 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8 DMA_50D/200D 7
F3 DMA_50D/200D 11 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 10 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 9
F4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 10 DMA_50D/200D 6 EPS_EarningsSurprise 3
F5 PE_Ratios_Q_Change 8 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 6 EPS_EarningsSurprise 5
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_EarningsSurprise 15 EPS_EarningsSurprise 15 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 13
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 13 Cost_Of_Revenue_Q_Change 10 Cost_Of_Revenue_Q_Change 10
F3 Inventory_Turnover 8 Cost_Of_Revenue_Q_Change 7 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 6
F4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 7 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 7 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 6
F5 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 10 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 7 Cost_Of_Revenue_Q_Change 5
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 41 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 6 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 4
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 16 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 13 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 7
F3 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 10 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 7 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 7
F4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 14 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 9 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 7
F5 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 11 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 7 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 6
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 13 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 12 EPS_EarningsSurprise 10
F2 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 11 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 7
F3 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 15 EPS_EarningsSurprise 8 EPS_EarningsSurprise 8
F4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 14 PC_Ratios_Y_Change 6 PC_Ratios_Y_Change 6
F5 Dividend_Payout_Ratio 8 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 6 EPS_EarningsSurprise 5
Table 7: Top five driving factors for the Basic Materials stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
15
2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_EarningsSurprise 65 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 21 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 7
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 41 EPS_EarningsSurprise 20 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 15
F3 Return_On_Common_Equity 29 Return_On_Common_Equity 29 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 16
F4 Return_On_Common_Equity 31 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 26 Net_Income_Y_Change 13
F5 Net_Income_Y_Change 35 Return_On_Common_Equity 14 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 7
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 70 EPS_EarningsSurprise 19 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 7
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 36 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 22 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 17
F3 Return_On_Common_Equity 30 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 21 EPS_EarningsSurprise 20
F4 Return_On_Common_Equity 32 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 11 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 6
F5 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 11 Net_Income_Y_Change 10 PE_Ratios 9
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_EarningsSurprise 47 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 25 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 21
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 35 EPS_EarningsSurprise 33 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 11
F3 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 25 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 21 Return_On_Common_Equity 16
F4 Return_On_Common_Equity 40 Net_Income_Y_Change 11 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8
F5 Net_Income_Y_Change 19 Return_On_Common_Equity 12 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 11
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_EarningsSurprise 61 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 16 Return_On_Common_Equity 12
F2 Return_On_Common_Equity 38 EPS_EarningsSurprise 20 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 17
F3 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 29 Return_On_Common_Equity 21 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 16
F4 Net_Income_Y_Change 27 Return_On_Common_Equity 19 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 16
F5 Net_Income_Y_Change 32 PE_Ratios 12 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 42 EPS_EarningsSurprise 28 EPS_EarningsSurprise 28
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 41 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 27 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 22
F3 Return_On_Common_Equity 22 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 21 EPS_EarningsSurprise 18
F4 Return_On_Common_Equity 26 Net_Income_Y_Change 25 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8
F5 Net_Income_Y_Change 29 Return_On_Common_Equity 24 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 10
Table 8: Top five driving factors for the Consumer Cyclical stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 41 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 28 EPS_EarningsSurprise 20
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 27 EPS_EarningsSurprise 26 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 23
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 32 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 15 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 11
F4 Return_On_Common_Equity 19 EPS_EarningsSurprise 10 Operating_Margin_Y_Change 8
F5 Return_On_Common_Equity 12 Operating_Margin_Y_Change 7 Operating_Margin_Y_Change 7
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 51 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 34 EPS_EarningsSurprise 10
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 35 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 34 EPS_EarningsSurprise 16
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 53 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 17 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8
F4 Operating_Income_Y_Change 22 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9 Return_On_Common_Equity 6
F5 Operating_Income_Y_Change 14 Return_On_Common_Equity 13 Cash_Q_Change 11
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 52 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 35 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 45 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 34 EPS_EarningsSurprise 13
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 46 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 10 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 8
F4 Return_On_Common_Equity 21 EPS_EarningsSurprise 7 EPS_EarningsSurprise 7
F5 Return_On_Common_Equity 15 Gross_Profit_Y_Change 13 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 8
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_EarningsSurprise 67 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 23 Dividend_Payout_Ratio_Q_Change 2
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 37 EPS_EarningsSurprise 22 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 13
F3 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 47 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 10 EPS_EarningsSurprise 5
F4 Return_On_Common_Equity 12 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 9 Dividend_Yield_Q_Change 7
F5 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 50 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 37 EPS_EarningsSurprise 13
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 35 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 33 EPS_EarningsSurprise 26
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 49 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 23 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 9
F4 Return_On_Common_Equity 16 Cash_Q_Change 11 EPS_EarningsSurprise 5
F5 Return_On_Common_Equity 16 Cash_Q_Change 6 EPS_EarningsSurprise 5
Table 9: Top five driving factors for the Consumer Non-Cyclical stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
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2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 95 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 5 EPS_EarningsSurprise 0
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 62 EPS_EarningsSurprise 11 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 5
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 28 EPS_EarningsSurprise 28 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 20
F4 PS_Ratios 29 EPS_EarningsSurprise 22 Operating_Margin_Y_Change 10
F5 PS_Ratios 19 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 14 EPS_EarningsSurprise 11
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 52 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 46 EPS_EarningsSurprise 1
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 47 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 34 EPS_EarningsSurprise 8
F3 PS_Ratios 31 EPS_EarningsSurprise 27 Income_from_Continued_Operations_Q_Change 10
F4 PS_Ratios 37 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 13 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9
F5 EPS_EarningsSurprise 13 PS_Ratios 11 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 8
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 50 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 47 EPS_EarningsSurprise 3
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 43 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 35 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9
F3 PS_Ratios 33 EPS_EarningsSurprise 27 Return_On_Common_Equity 4
F4 PS_Ratios 38 EPS_EarningsSurprise 18 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 8
F5 EPS_EarningsSurprise 15 PS_Ratios 11 Return_On_Common_Equity 10
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 92 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 6 Inventory_Turnover 2
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 78 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8 EPS_EarningsSurprise 5
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 49 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 19 PS_Ratios 13
F4 PS_Ratios 31 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 24 EPS_EarningsSurprise 19
F5 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 28 PS_Ratios 21 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 86 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 13 EPS_EarningsSurprise 1
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 71 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 12 PS_Ratios 4
F3 PS_Ratios 52 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 8
F4 PS_Ratios 26 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 18 EPS_EarningsSurprise 15
F5 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 12 PS_Ratios 7 Short_Term_Debt_Y_Change 6
Table 10: Top five driving factors for the Financial stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 57 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 14 EPS_EarningsSurprise 13
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 26 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 18 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 11
F3 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 24 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 16 EPS_EarningsSurprise 15
F4 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 18 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 11 EPS_EarningsSurprise 10
F5 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 12 EPS_EarningsSurprise 11 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 8
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 53 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 15 EPS_EarningsSurprise 11
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 37 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 17 Dividend_Payout_Ratio_Y_Change 7
F3 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 13 EPS_EarningsSurprise 11 Dividend_Payout_Ratio_Y_Change 10
F4 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 18 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12 Operating_Income_Y_Change 11
F5 Dividend_Payout_Ratio_Y_Change 9 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 7 DMA_5D/200D 6
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_EarningsSurprise 31 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 21 Operating_Income_Y_Change 9
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 22 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 14 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 14
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 18 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 11 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 9
F4 Operating_Income_Y_Change 11 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 10 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 10
F5 Operating_Income_Y_Change 15 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 8 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 7
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 61 EPS_EarningsSurprise 11 EPS_EarningsSurprise 11
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 18 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 16 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 15
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 19 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 11 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 9
F4 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 11
F5 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 8
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 55 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 14 EPS_EarningsSurprise 6
F2 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 18 EPS_EarningsSurprise 17 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 12
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 20 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 10 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 9
F4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Diff 11 EPS_EarningsSurprise 8 Return_On_Assets_Q_Change 7
F5 Operating_Income_Y_Change 9 EPS_EarningsSurprise 8 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 7
Table 11: Top five driving factors for the Technology stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
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2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 27 Net_Income_Y_Change 18 PE_Ratios 13
F2 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 26 Net_Income_Y_Change 18 Operating_Income_Y_Change 8
F3 Operating_Income_Y_Change 15 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 13 PE_Ratios 11
F4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 11 PC_Ratios 6 PC_Ratios 6
F5 Net_Income_Y_Change 13 Operating_Income_Y_Change 9 PE_Ratios 7
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 PE_Ratios 37 PB_Ratios_Y_Change 8 PB_Ratios_Y_Change 8
F2 Net_Income_Y_Change 17 PE_Ratios 14 PB_Ratios_Y_Change 8
F3 PB_Ratios_Y_Change 12 PB_Ratios_Y_Change 12 Net_Income_Y_Change 10
F4 Net_Income_Y_Change 17 Cost_Of_Revenue_Y_Change 9 PB_Ratios_Y_Change 8
F5 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 9 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8 Cost_Of_Revenue_Y_Change 7
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 21 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 12 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 6
F2 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 11 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 10 PE_Ratios 7
F3 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 12 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 10 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 8
F4 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 8 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 7 PE_Ratios 6
F5 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 13 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8 PE_Ratios 7
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 18 PE_Ratios 12 Operating_Income_Y_Change 8
F2 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 14 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 11 PE_Ratios 10
F3 Operating_Income_Y_Change 10 PE_Ratios 8 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 7
F4 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 11 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8 PE_Ratios 7
F5 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 14 PE_Ratios 5 DMA_50D/200D 4
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 41 PE_Ratios 8 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 7
F2 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 20 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 16 PE_Ratios 7
F3 Total_Liabilities_Q_Change 12 PS_Ratios_Y_Change 10 PE_Ratios 8
F4 Operating_Income_Y_Change 7 Operating_Income_Y_Change 7 PE_Ratios 6
F5 PE_Ratios 12 Cost_Of_Revenue_Y_Change 6 Cost_Of_Revenue_Y_Change 6
Table 12: Top five driving factors for the Communications stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_EarningsSurprise 33 DMA_50D/200D 15 DMA_5D/200D 5
F2 PS_Ratios 15 EPS_EarningsSurprise 13 DMA_50D/200D 8
F3 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12 DMA_50D/200D 8 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 5
F4 DMA_50D/200D 9 PC_Ratios_Q_Change 8 PC_Ratios_Q_Change 8
F5 EPS_EarningsSurprise 6 EPS_EarningsSurprise 6 DMA_5D/200D 5
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_EarningsSurprise 34 DMA_5D/200D 8 DMA_5D/200D 8
F2 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12 DMA_50D/200D 9
F3 Current_Ratio 12 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 10 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9
F4 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 7 EPS_EarningsSurprise 6 EPS_EarningsSurprise 6
F5 DMA_50D/200D 9 Current_Ratio 8 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 6
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 DMA_50D/200D 24 DMA_5D/200D 13 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 12
F2 DMA_50D/200D 15 PS_Ratios 14 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 13
F3 DMA_50D/200D 13 DMA_50D/200D 13 DMA_5D/200D 11
F4 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 18 DMA_50D/200D 12 EPS_EarningsSurprise 8
F5 DMA_50D/200D 11 PS_Ratios 9 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 8
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 69 Gross_Profit_Q_Change 5 DMA_50D/200D 4
F2 DMA_5D/200D 16 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 11 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9
F3 PS_Ratios 14 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 11 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9
F4 DMA_5D/200D 9 PS_Ratios 7 EPS_EarningsSurprise 6
F5 DMA_5D/200D 12 PS_Ratios 11 Gross_Profit_Q_Change 6
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 PS_Ratios 20 DMA_5D/200D 15 EPS_EarningsSurprise 12
F2 PS_Ratios 17 EPS_EarningsSurprise 14 DMA_50D/200D 11
F3 PS_Ratios 18 EPS_Earnings_Surprise_Backward_Ave_Diff 15 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9
F4 DMA_50D/200D 11 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 10 EPS_EarningsSurprise 9
F5 DMA_50D/200D 11 Cash_Q_Change 10 PS_Ratios 8
Table 13: Top five driving factors for the Energy stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
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2018 Highest Occurance Count Second HighestOccurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 38 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 12 Return_On_Assets 3
F2 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 19 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 18 DMA_50D/200D 6
F3 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 10 Net_Debt_to_EBIT_Y_Change 6 Net_Debt_to_EBIT_Y_Change 6
F4 Short_Term_Debt_Y_Change 8 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 7 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 7
F5 Short_Term_Debt_Y_Change 7 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 6 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 5
2017 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 36 Dividend_Yield_Y_Change 28 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 8
F2 Dividend_Yield_Y_Change 24 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 18 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 12
F3 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 20 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 11 Dividend_Yield_Y_Change 8
F4 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 11 Dividend_Yield_Y_Change 7 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 6
F5 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 11 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 9 PC_Ratios_Y_Change 6
2016 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 20 Operating_Margin_Y_Change 18 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 14
F2 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 18 Operating_Margin_Y_Change 10 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 7
F3 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 13 Operating_Margin_Y_Change 8 DMA_5D/50D 7
F4 Operating_Margin_Y_Change 10 Operating_Margin_Y_Change 10 PC_Ratios_Y_Change 6
F5 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 6 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 6 PC_Ratios 5
2015 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 21 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 13 DMA_5D/50D 12
F2 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 19 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 12 DMA_5D/50D 5
F3 Return_On_Assets_Y_Change 13 DMA_5D/50D 9 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 8
F4 DMA_5D/50D 12 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 7 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 7
F5 PC_Ratios 6 PC_Ratios 6 PC_Ratios 6
2014 Highest Occurance Count Second Highest Occurance Count Third Highest Occurance Count
F1 PC_Ratios 12 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 10 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 8
F2 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 7 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 5 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 5
F3 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 5 Free_Cash_Flow_Q_Change 5 Net_Debt_to_EBIT_Y_Change 4
F4 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 6 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 6 Cost_Of_Revenue_Q_Change 5
F5 Short_Term_Debt_Q_Change 5 PC_Ratios 4 PC_Ratios 4
Table 14: Top five driving factors for the Utilities stocks in each financial reporting year from 2014 to 2018.
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